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MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA HEATS UP CLIMATE 
POLICY NO LESS THAN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW:  A COMMENT ON PROFESSORS WATTS 
AND WILDERMUTH 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
Massachusetts v. EPA1 is easily the Supreme Court’s most important 
environmental law decision in well over a decade.  By a vote of 5–4, the 
Supreme Court set the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on a course 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and potentially remade much of ad-
ministrative law.2  While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to authorize 
broad federal regulatory authority in other areas, the Massachusetts major-
ity readily unearthed expansive yet untapped authority to control emissions 
of the most ubiquitous byproduct of modern industry.  It is no wonder envi-
ronmental advocates greeted the decision with cheer. 
In their essay, Massachusetts v. EPA:  Breaking New Ground on Issues 
Other than Global Warming,3 Professors Kathryn A. Watts and Amy J. 
Wildermuth have presented a thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
handiwork in Massachusetts v. EPA.  They are correct that the decision po-
tentially paves new ground in administrative law, particularly with regard to 
state standing.  The Court’s approach to review of agency decisions to de-
cline rulemaking petitions is also potentially significant, but less ground-
breaking than Watts and Wildermuth suggest.  In the context of climate 
change policy, their assessment of the Court’s decision is farthest from the 
mark, however, for the Massachusetts majority did everything it could, 
 
*  Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law.  Professor Adler participated in an amicus curiae brief of law professors and 
the Cato Institute in Massachusetts v. EPA available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/ 
ma_v_epa_10-24-06.pdf.  Thanks are due to Tai Antoine for her research assistance.  Any errors, omis-
sions, or inanities are solely the fault of the author. 
1  127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007) (link). 
2  For one account of how broadly Massachusetts v. EPA may have altered administrative law doc-
trine, see Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA:  The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. 
REV. IN BRIEF 73 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf (link).  For this 
author’s view, see Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 61 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf (link).  
3  Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA:  Breaking New Ground on Issues 
Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17 (link). 
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given the posture of the case, to ensure federal regulation of greenhouse 
gases from motor vehicles and other emission sources.  It is true, as a tech-
nical matter, that “the Court’s opinion did not order the EPA to regulate 
with respect to climate change.”4  Yet there should be little doubt that the 
Court’s judgment in the case gives the Agency little option but to regulate, 
and not just emissions from new motor vehicles.  Unless the relevant provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act are revised by Congress in new climate change 
legislation, Massachusetts v. EPA will mean greenhouse gas emission limits 
on industrial facilities and the likely regulation of carbon dioxide as a crite-
ria air pollutant.5 
I. STANDING FOR STATES 
Professors Watts and Wildermuth are certainly correct to say the Mas-
sachusetts majority’s treatment of standing was “unusual.”6  For starters, 
the Court applied the traditional elements of standing in a most undemand-
ing fashion.  Not only did the Court find a “rather small and remote injury” 
to be sufficient to satisfy the injury element,7 it further concluded that Sec-
tion 307 of the Clean Air Act accords plaintiffs a “procedural right” justify-
ing a relaxation of “the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy.”8  As a consequence, the familiar requirements explicated in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife9 may well present a less daunting challenge 
to future litigants in regulatory matters, particularly those concerning dis-
persed environmental harms.  Even more surprising, however, was the 
Court’s newfound solicitude to the standing of state litigants, based upon 
authority and a line of reasoning not presented in any of the parties’ or 
amici briefs before the Court. 
The Court proclaimed that state standing claims are “entitled to special 
solicitude” in federal court.10  The Court reached this conclusion by arguing 
that a century-old case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,11 demonstrated that 
states are not ordinary litigants for the purposes of invoking the jurisdiction 
of federal courts.12  In that case, a downwind state, Georgia, sought judicial 
relief from upwind pollution under the federal common law of interstate 
 
4  Id. at 1. 
5  “Criteria air pollutants” are those air pollutants for which the EPA is required to establish National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (link); see 
also EPA, What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants? (2007), available at http://epa.gov/air/urbanair/ 
(link) (referring to those pollutants for which the EPA sets NAAQS as “criteria pollutants”).  This is dis-
cussed in further detail infra notes 42–50, and accompanying text. 
6  Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 2. 
7  Id. at 3. 
8  Massachusetts v. EPA,127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
9  504 U.S. 555 (1992) (link). 
10  Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1455. 
11  206 U.S. 230 (1907) (link). 
12  Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1454. 
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nuisance.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, found that 
Georgia could seek equitable relief that was potentially unavailable to pri-
vate litigants, but this hardly establishes that states should receive “special 
solicitude” when seeking standing to challenge agency action (or inaction) 
under a regulatory statute.  As Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent amply demon-
strates, Georgia had little if anything to do with Article III standing.13  The 
Court’s finding here is also a bit ironic, as the statute at issue in Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act, almost surely preempts the sort of action 
brou
 
ght by Georgia in Georgia.14 
The applicability of Georgia to Massachusetts is anything but obvious. 
While the Massachusetts majority could have grounded their newfound ap-
proach to state standing in the framework provided by prior court decisions, 
such as Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel Barez,15 it did not.  
As Professors Watts and Wildermuth show, but do not stress, the Court’s 
ultimate treatment of Massachusetts’ state interests is a bit confused.16  As 
Professors Watts and Wildermuth further note, the Court could have chosen 
to rest state standing upon other state sovereign interests, such as a state’s 
interest in preventing the potential federal preemption of its own laws.17  
Yet the Court did not do so.  Where Professors Watts and Wildermuth 
would like to argue that the Court’s reasoning supports state standing when 
federal action threatens to preempt state law, the reasoning of the Court 
could cut the other way, insofar as it articulates a theoretical framework for 
federal-state relations that justifies federal preeminence in climate change 
policy.  Specifically, the Court stressed that states surrendered certain “sov-
ereign prerogatives” to the federal government, including the ability to take 
 
o 
reg e Clean Air Act, then claims that greenhouse gas emissions consti-
tute
U.S. 592 (1982) (link). 
riss as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Res
13  See Id. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
14  See Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of In-
terstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717, 768–69 n.476 (2004) (“Although the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the question of whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts federal common law in 
disputes over transboundary air pollution, it is widely assumed to do so, particularly in light of the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a comprehensive federal permit scheme similar to that es-
tablished by the Clean Water Act.”).  Under the relevant analysis, if greenhouse gases are subject t
ulation as air pollutants under th
 or contribute to an interstate nuisance under the federal common law are almost surely preempted. 
15  458 
16  Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 8 (noting “confusion” about the Court’s approach to state 
standing). 
17  Professor Wildermuth served as Counsel of Record for an amicus curiae brief in Massachusetts v. 
EPA submitted on behalf of several states.  See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), available at 
http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/MassBriefs/Mass%20v%20EPA--Amici%20States.pdf (link).  
For a critique of these alternative arguments for state standing, see Brief of The Cato Institute and Law 
Professors Jonathan H. Adler, James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Mor
pondents at 14–17, Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/legalbriefs/ma_v_epa_10-24-06.pdf (link). 
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direct action to control interstate air pollution.18  If such prerogatives “are 
now lodged in the Federal Government,”19 states have less basis to com-
plain
 at least where they seek 
to redress broadly dispersed environmental harms. 
 if federal air pollution regulation preempts state actions. 
The implications of the Court’s newfound solicitude for state standing 
are far from clear.  Insofar as the Court was motivated by a concern for state 
“dignity,” as indicated by the majority’s reliance upon Alden v. Maine,20 it 
may be short-lived, as Justice Kennedy is the only member of the Massa-
chusetts majority who has shown much concern for such interests.  Alterna-
tively, the Court could be signaling a “special solicitude” for state efforts to 
drive public policy through the courts—a form of state-driven “regulation 
by litigation”21—as has been attempted by quite a few state attorneys gen-
eral in recent years.22  Another possibility is that the decision will simply be 
used to dilute the standards for standing more generally, and not simply for 
states.  As already noted, the Court’s application of Lujan was anything but 
rigorous and certainly suggests a particular solicitude—“special” or not—
for citizen suit plaintiffs challenging agency action,
II. REVIEW OF RULEMAKING PETITION DENIALS 
Another important question in Massachusetts v. EPA was what stan-
dard of review would be applied to the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking peti-
tion.  The Court’s resolution of this question would be important even if for 
no other reason than it had never explicitly answered it before.  The Massa-
chusetts majority did not create a new standard, however.23  Rather, it ex-
plicitly adopted the deferential standard articulated in 1987 by the U.S. 
 
18  Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1454 (“When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign 
e exer-
cise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.”). 
vinces or political corporations, but re-
tain
0 (2005) (link) (discussing choice of 
reg
rg/pdf/5719.pdf (link) (criticizing use of litigation as a 
reg
eaks new ground” 
wit cy refusals to initiate rulemakings). 
prerogatives.  Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some circumstances th
19  Id. 
20  Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (link), for the proposition that “in the fed-
eral system, the States ‘are not relegated to the role of mere pro
 the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty’”). 
21  See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) (documenting ex-
amples of the use of litigation to regulate economic activity); see also Andrew P. Morriss et al., Choos-
ing How To Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 203–1
ulation by litigation in contrast to other regulatory strategies). 
22  The litigation campaign against cigarette companies that eventually led to the “Master Settlement 
Agreement” is the most infamous example of state attorney general “regulation by litigation.”  State at-
torneys general have also filed suits against gun manufacturers, paint companies, and other corporations 
alleged to have committed wrongs against the public.  Not all have viewed this as a positive develop-
ment.  See, e.g., Hans Bader, Competitve Enter. Inst., The Nation’s Top Ten Worst State Attorneys Gen-
eral (2007), available at http://www.cei.o
ulatory tactic by state attorneys general). 
23  Cf. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 2 (stating “the Court’s decision br
h regard to judicial review of agen
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/20/ 35 




ad the Agency simply de-
cline
rt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in American Horse Protection Asso-
ciation v. Lyng24 and followed by the D.C. Circuit ever since. 
In American Horse Protection Association, the D.C. Circuit held that 
agency denials of a petition for rulemaking were subject to judicial review, 
unlike an agency’s refusal to initiate an enforcement action.25  An agency’s 
formal denial of a rulemaking petition, like an actual enforcement action 
(but unlike a failure to initiate enforcement) provides a focal point for judi-
cial scrutiny.  Under American Horse Protection Association judicial re-
view should be limited and quite deferential.26  But here, as elsewhere, 
deference does not mean abdication.27  In American Horse Protection Asso-
ciation the D.C. Circuit remanded the Secretary of Agriculture’s refusal to 
initiate rulemaking on the grounds that his proffered reasons were in
t.  Thus, adoption of this deferential standard of review does not pre-
clude judicial invalidation of agency denials of rulemaking petitions. 
Unlike Professors Watts and Wildermuth, I do not find the Massachu-
setts majority’s review of the EPA’s action to be particularly searching or 
severe—let alone “meticulous and probing.”28  Nor is it at odds with the 
D.C. Circuit standard embraced by the Supreme Court.  The Massachusetts 
majority did not scrutinize or second-guess the EPA’s articulated reasons 
for refusing to regulate so much as it held that the EPA’s reasons were im-
permissible under the Clean Air Act.  The Court did not conclude that the 
EPA was wrong in asserting that new vehicle emission standards were im-
practical or inefficient, or that a rulemaking could conflict with efforts to 
forge international action on climate change.  Such rationales, according to 
the Court, simply could not justify a refusal to regulate because they were 
divorced from the relevant statutory text.29  H
d to rule on the petition, citing resource constraints and other agency 
priorities, the outcome may well have been different. 
The Court’s approach was wholly consistent with the standard of re-
view set forth in American Horse Protection Association.  While the D.C. 
Circuit held that denials of rulemaking petitions should only be overturned 
 
gal as opposed to fac-
tua
 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (review of petition denials should be “extremely limited” and “highly def-
ere
nterpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally em-
plo
eny the rulemaking peti-
tion
24  812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
25  Id. at 4 (“[R]efusals to institute rulemaking proceedings are distinguishable from other sorts of 
nonenforcement decisions insofar as they are less frequent, more apt to involve le
l analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public explanation.”). 
26  Id. at 7; see also Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 
F.2d 93, 96
ntial”). 
27  Cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (link) (“deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those 
agency i
y”). 
28  Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 12. 
29  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007) (EPA’s decision to d
 was based upon “reasoning divorced from the statutory text”). 
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“in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances,” it specifically identi-
fied an agency’s failure to abide by the explicit terms of the relevant author-
izing statute as the sort of error that a reviewing court should correct.30  
This standard of review requires that the reviewing court consider and in-
terpret the relevant statutory language so as to determine whether the 
agency acted in a lawful fashion.  Because Congress specified that the EPA 
is required to regulate emissions that the Administrator concludes “cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare,”31 the Agency’s other rationales for not regulating 
were
ruling on a petition, 
but a petition denial.  Nor did it require the Court to carefully examine the 
evidenc oke no new 
grou
nly a matter of time.  In 
this 
 irrelevant.  This was particularly true given the EPA’s own admission 
in the petition denial that the statutory threshold for regulation had effec-
tively been met.32 
In adopting and faithfully applying the D.C. Circuit’s American Horse 
Protection Association test for the review of agency denial of rulemaking 
petitions the Court helped clarify this area of the law, but it did not depart 
from established precedent, and should not have been “surprising.”33  Mas-
sachusetts did not involve an agency decision to defer 
e behind the EPA’s arguments.  In short, the Court br
nd here.34  Rather, it paved over a well-worn path. 
III. FUTURE GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 
Whatever impact Massachusetts v. EPA has on administrative law, one 
thing is certain:  Barring congressional intervention, this decision will cause 
the EPA to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases from new motor ve-
hicles, as well as from other sources.  As a technical matter, the Court re-
manded the matter back to the Agency for further proceedings, given the 
EPA’s failure to offer a “reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide 
whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to climate change.”35  As a 
practical matter, however, the EPA has already made this determination, so 
the adoption of new vehicle emission standards is o
regard, I disagree with Professors Watts and Wildermuth that “in acting 
on the rulemaking petition, the EPA plainly had not determined whether 
greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.”36 
 
5 (internal quotations omitted). 
ding “the level of scrutiny that the Court applied” to 
the 
opinion “breaks 
new  Id. at 2, 11. 
3 (2007). 
30  Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 812 F.2d at 
31  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (link). 
32  See infra notes 39–40, and accompanying text. 
33  Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 12 (fin
EPA’s rulemaking petition denial “surprising”). 
34  Professors Watts and Wildermuth, on the other hand, believe that the Court’s 
 ground” and constitutes a “ramped up review of rulemaking denials.” 
35  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 146
36  Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 3, at 14. 
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Section 202 of the Clean Air Act provides that the EPA “shall” set 
emission standards for new vehicles for “any air pollutant” the Administra-
tor concludes causes or contributes to air pollution “which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”37  Once it is estab-
lished that greenhouse gases are air pollutants for the purpose of this provi-
sion, the EPA has little choice to regulate unless it is prepared to argue that 
the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere cannot “reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”  Were the EPA operat-
ing on a clean slate, it is perhaps conceivable that the Agency could deny 
that 
ers.40  Whatever the merits of the EPA’s pol-
icy a
anthropogenic greenhouse gases will have such effects, and that such a 
conclusion would withstand legal challenge.38  But, at this point, the EPA is 
not operating on a clean slate and so the Agency’s obligation to regulate 
under Section 202 should be a foregone conclusion. 
The EPA’s own prior statements and actions are simply incompatible 
with a determination that greenhouse gases do not contribute to air pollution 
that can be reasonably anticipated to threaten public health and welfare.  In 
fact, in denying the petition to regulate greenhouse gases under Section 202, 
the EPA endorsed President Bush’s statement that the federal government 
“must address” climate change and suggested that one reason not to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles was because the 
Bush Administration had already undertaken other policies to “reduce the 
risk” of global climate change.39  The EPA did not deny that greenhouse 
gases contributed to climate change, or even suggest that anthropogenic 
emissions could not be anticipated to affect health or welfare.  Rather, it ar-
gued that the nature of the problem called for a “different policy approach” 
than that sought by the petition
rgument that adopting new vehicle emission standards would constitute 
“an inefficient, piecemeal approach” to the problem of climate change, 
Congress did not delegate the EPA the discretion to make such policy 
judgments under Section 202. 
Once the EPA makes the required endangerment finding under Section 
202, it will be child’s play to force greenhouse gas emission regulation un-
 
 contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
42 
lenge, despite the substantial deference that reviewing courts show to agen-
cie
ments that global warming is 
a pr .  See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1458. 
37  Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act provides, in relevant part: 
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air 
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his 
judgment cause, or
health or welfare. 
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). 
38  I stress the word “perhaps” here because this would be a difficult position for the EPA to assert 
and sustain against legal chal
s’ scientific assessments. 
39  68 Fed. Reg. 52,925 (link). 
40  68 Fed. Reg. 52,929 (link).  This apparent inconsistency in the EPA’s arguments was not lost on 
the majority, which “attach[ed] considerable significance” to Agency state
oblem that must be addressed
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/20/ 38 
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der other Clean Air Act provisions.  Section 111 of the Act requires the 
Agency to set emission performance standards for stationary sources that 
“cause[] or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”41  If greenhouse gases 
satisfy the requirements of Section 202, they almost surely satisfy Section 
111 as well.  Section 111 only requires the adoption of emission standards 
whe
ly be anticipated to endanger public 
heal
and there were more cost-effective 
mea
 to submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure that 
all metropolitan areas will meet the standards.46  Here is where the real im-
plementation difficulties would begin, as the SIP process was designed for 
n a given classification of pollution sources contributes “significantly” 
to the air pollution in question, so insignificant sources of emission would 
remain unregulated.  Larger sources, however, such as coal-burning power 
plants and some industrial facilities would not be so lucky. 
The next provisions that could be triggered are more interesting, and 
perhaps a bit more troubling.  Under Section 108 of the Act, the EPA Ad-
ministrator is required to create a list of criteria air pollutants that includes 
“each air pollutant, emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute 
to air pollution which may reasonab
th or welfare” that is emitted into the ambient air by “numerous or di-
verse mobile or stationary sources.”42  This endangerment standard is prac-
tically indistinguishable from that in Section 202; a pollutant that satisfies 
one almost surely satisfies the other. 
The only potential distinction in Section 108 is additional language 
providing that the pollutant in question must be one for which the EPA 
Administrator “plans to issue air quality criteria under this section,” but 
there is little reason to believe that the EPA could refuse to regulate green-
house gases on this basis.  In fact, this argument was flatly rejected by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit over thirty years ago in Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council v. Train.43  In Train, the EPA argued that it 
could opt not to include lead as a criteria air pollutant because it did not 
plan to issue air quality criteria on lead 
ns of controlling lead emissions.  The Second Circuit found the former 
argument wholly unpersuasive and the latter argument irrelevant given the 
text of the Act.44  Unless NRDC v. Train was wrongly decided, the rationale 
would apply equally to carbon dioxide. 
Once a pollutant is listed, the EPA must develop a criteria document 
and, under Section 109, establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) for the pollutant.45  Once the NAAQS are in place, Section 110 
requires states
 
.S.C. § 7411 (link). 
 Cir. 1976). 
41  42 U
42  42 U.S.C. § 7408 (link). 
43  545 F.2d 320, 325–26 (2d
44  Id. 
45  42 U.S.C. § 7409 (link). 
46  42 U.S.C. § 7410 (link). 
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cont
submit acceptable plans would eventually lead to the adop-
tion
ts regulatory burden.  The Massachusetts majority concluded the 
Clean Air Act’s requirements are unambiguous, and the agency must now 
comply. 
rolling localized, ambient pollution problems, not protecting the global 
atmosphere.47 
The EPA might wish to argue that the NAAQS regulatory regime is 
fundamentally ill-suited to greenhouse gas control.  The Agency would 
have a point—albeit one rejected by the Massachusetts majority.  The 
meaningful measure of greenhouse gas pollution levels is their concentra-
tion in the global atmosphere, not the locally ambient air.  There is nothing 
any given jurisdiction can do to comply with a NAAQS for carbon dioxide 
unless emissions are controlled worldwide.  No SIP could possibly meet a 
greenhouse gas NAAQS set in accordance with the Act’s requirements.  
Nonetheless, the Massachusetts majority explicitly rejected the idea that 
recognizing greenhouse gases as pollutants under the CAA would produce 
any unintuitive or illogical results,48 so this argument is foreclosed.  At best, 
state failure to 
 of a Federal Implementation Plan under Section 179,49 likely after 
years of litigation.50 
In sum, not only does the Court’s Massachusetts decision effectively 
obligate the EPA to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from new mo-
tor vehicles, if applied consistently it will also require the EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gases from other sources as well.  The resulting regulations may 
have practical difficulties and inefficiencies, but this will not relieve the 
EPA of i
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 
As a practical matter it will take years for the EPA to comply with the 
Court’s judgment,51 and years more for additional litigation to force the 
EPA’s hand.  In the meantime, climate policy will not stand still.  Domesti-
 
lobally:  The Limits of Local Climate 
Pol  (2007) (link) (discussing the limits of local emission control policies to 
add
ay 14, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
rele
47  See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act G
icies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 101
ress global climate change and the need for a national, if not global, emission control strategy). 
48  Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459–60 (2007). 
49  42 U.S.C. § 7509 (link). 
50  See Posting of Jonathan Wiener to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/climate_policy_.html (Apr. 3, 2007) (link) (describing 
a scenario in which the FIP requirement of Section 179 is triggered). 
51  On May 14, 2007, President George W. Bush instructed the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency to coordinate with the heads of other relevant federal agencies and develop regula-
tions responsive to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA that would be finalized “by 
the end of 2008.”  See Press Release, The White House, President Bush Discusses CAFE and Alterna-
tive Fuel Standards (M
ases/2007/05/20070514-4.html (link); see also Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717 (May 
16, 2007), available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/ 
2007/pdf/07-2462.pdf (link). 
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cally, state and local governments will continue to experiment with climate-
related policies of various sorts.52  California hopes to obtain a waiver from 
the EPA allowing it to adopt vehicle emission standards of its own, and 
other states have announced a desire to follow suit.53  Foreign nations and 
international organizations will simultaneously develop emission targets 
and cooperative agreements.  As this is being written, the President is pro-
posing a new climate policy approach for the fifteen nations with the great-
est greenhouse gas emissions,54 and the U.S. House of Representatives is 
considering a bill that could become the first federal statute to explicitly re-
quire the regulation of greenhouse gases as such.55  Should either of these or 
other climate proposals become law, the EPA may be relieved of regulating 
greenhouse gases under Section 202 and other provisions of the Act.  None-
thele
ental concerns.  If this 
is the way climate policy is to be made, there are ample reasons to be less 
than sanguine about the ultimate results. 
ss, it would be a mistake to diminish the importance of Massachusetts 
v. EPA in forcing the EPA’s hand. 
It is also worth considering that, as things now stand, Massachusetts v. 
EPA effectively forces the adoption of climate change policies that were not 
the product of legislative deliberation and a policy dialogue on the costs and 
benefits of various climate policy strategies.  Rather, the regulation to be 
spawned by Massachusetts v. EPA is the consequence of a judicial con-
struction of decades-old legislative language clearly and unequivocally de-
signed to address a wholly different set of environm
 
52  See, e.g., BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004) (detailing state-level climate change policies); see also 
Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 
282 (2003) (link) (noting that many states “have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that some 
believe exists at the national level”). 
53  See Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., to Stephen L. John-
son, Adm’r, EPA (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/waiver.pdf (link).  
54  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Proposes Goals on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 
2007, at A1 (link). 
55  See, e.g., Zachary Coilie, Dems Drafting Bill that Could Derail State Warming Law, S.F. 
CHRON., June 5, 2007, at A-1 (link); H. Josef Hebert, Bill Would Block States on Auto Rules, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 4, 2007 (link). 
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